Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1961

The State of Utah v. Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Roland G. Robinson, Jr.; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Stewart, No. 9331 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3790

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-FILED
-=~::.s s·~· 1961

THE STATE OF UTAH '
------------..::;!
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

-------------------------------------i·-·······....-.g

r!t, Supreme Court, Utah

Case
No. 9331

LEO BARRETT STEWART, JR.,
Defendarn,t and Appellant.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
ROLAND G. ROBISON, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS......................................................................

2

ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................

2

POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
TESTIMONY RELATING TO PRIOR ACCIDENTS............

2

POINT IIEVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO PRIOR ACCIDENTS,
SUCH ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL..............................

9

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF SUCH ERROR
WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL............

13

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................

14

Authorities Cited
70 ALR 2d 170, 171, 192............................................................................ 3, 7
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, 304, p. 282............................................................

3

5A C. J. S., Appeal and Error, 1069, 1080.............................................. 7, 9
Cases Cited
Parker v. Bamberger, et al., 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425....................

4

Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320, 159 Pac. 530........................

5

State v. Justesen, 99 Pac. 456..................................................................

9

State v. Neal (1953), 262 P. 2d 756........................................................

9

Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland v. Ogden City, 88 Utah 389,
54 P. 2d 849..........................................................................................

4

Statutes Cited
77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953........................................................

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9331

LEO BARRETT STEWART, JR.,
Defenda.n.t and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESP·O·NDENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Reference in respondent's brief to the record of proceedings of the trial court will be designated by the letter
"R" and to appellant's brief by the letter "B."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent finds itself in substantial agreement with
the facts as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, and hence
does not submit a separate statement of facts in connection with its brief.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO
PRIOR ACCIDENTS.
POINT

II.
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUCH ERROR WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
PoiNT

PoiNT

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF
SUCH ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING TESTIJ\IONY RELATING TO
PRIOR ACCIDENTS.
PoiNT

The general rule of lR\V regarding the admissibility of
evidence of prior accidents is rorrecti~~ set forth by appellant. (B. 32)
"It is recognized in numerous cases that for certain purposes, at least, evidence of other similar
accidents or injuries at or near the same place or
by use of the same appliance suffered by persons
other than the plaintiff and in other and different
times, not too remote in point of time from the
2
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particular occurrence, is admissible. Evidence of
prior similar accidents, when admissible, is generally admissible for the following purposes only:
(1) To show the existence of a defective or dangerous condition or appliance and the dangerous
character of the place of injury or of the machine
or the appliance, and (2) to show the defendant's
notice or knowledge thereof."
20 Am. J ur ., Evidence, 304, p. 282.
The rule generally is applicable, however, only in
those cases wherein there is substantial similarity between the circumstances surrounding the prior accident
and the one before the Court.
''The pertinence of such evidence is, of course,
drawn from the facts that the various accidents
occurred at the same place and under conditions
which were at least substantially similar, and the
courts have frequently emphasized the necessity
of showing such similarity of conditions as a
predicate for the admission of the evidence. However, it has usually been held that only substantial
similarity of conditions is required, and there is
perhaps evident a trend - probably part of a
general trend toward the more liberal admission
of evidence - toward treating the question of
sufficiency of similarity of conditions as primarily
a matter for the trial court's discretion, and to
freely admit the evidence of the prior accident together with evidence of variations in conditions,
which is treated as going to weight rather than
admissibility.''
Anno. : 70 ALR 2d 170, 171. (See cases cited
therein.) The annotation goes on to say that this type
of evidence is sometimes excluded on the grounds that
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it is inconvenient for the court to investigate prior accidents to determine their relevancy; and further, that
whether this evidence shall be admitted is best determined by the court in its discretion.
'• The strongest attack of evidence of the type here
considered has been based upon grounds of trial
convenience rather than upon its lack of relevance.
Especially in the earlier cases, the courts have
expressed the fear that if the evidence were received the trial would be disrupted by the necessity of investigating all the circumstances of the
various incidents in question, and have concluded
that the simplest and most desirable solution was
to exclude all such evidence. However, in the more
recent decisions in most jurisdictions there is apparent a tendency to treat this question ad hoc,
leaving it to the trial judge in each case to determine whether the evidence should be excluded on
this ground and, if the evidence is admitted, to determine the extent to which the circumstances of
the earlier accident can be investigated." (p. 172)
Appellant cites several Utah cases wherein the general rule regarding admission of evidence of prior accidents has been substantially adopted. It should be noted
that in all of these cases the circumstances involving the
prior accidents were substantially similar to the ones before the court. The Bamberger case, Parker v. Bamberger, et al., 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, dealt with an
allegedly defective wig-wag signal. Evidence that this
same signal had failed to function on previous occasions
was held to be properly admitted. In the Stocker case,
Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland v. Ogden City, 88 Utah
389, 54 P. 2d 849, it was alleged that water from a cer4
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tain stream was contaminated. The Court admitted evidence showing that others had drunk from the same
stream with no apparent ill effects. The Shugren case,
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320, 159 Pac. 530, was
concerned with an allegedly defective sidewalk. Evidence
was admitted that others had tripped on that same piece
of sidewalk.
In each of these cases the relevancy of the evidence
admitted to the question before the court is apparent. In
one case the same wig-wag signal is involved; in another
the same stream and source of water ; and in the third
the same defective piece of sidewalk.
But as regards the instant case, this requirement of
similarity of conditions is not met. The appellant's
proffer of proof (B. 20; R. 91) is to the effect that Mr.
Challis, if allowed to testify, '' * * * would testify with
reference to the number of accidents which occurred at
the intersection in the year 1959, the total of 24 in all,
to show their relationship to the present or to the case
at bar and the similarities that existed between them.''
Also, Mr. Challis would have testified that the intersection in question had one of the highest accident ratios
in Salt Lake City for the five years preceding 1959; that
studies had been made of the dangerous condition of the
intersection; and that, among other things, changes in
the semaphore system were recommended because of the
difficulty in detecting the color of the light when the
rays of the sun were directly upon it. (See appellant's
proffer of proof.)
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Apparently, appellant wanted Mr. Challis to testify
concerning the history of accidents at the intersection for
a period of at least one year, and possibly as many as
five. Appellant testified at the trial that he observed
the semaphore some 150 feet from the intersection, and
that it was green at the time. (R. 88) He further testified that the rays of the sun were bearing down into
the signal as he approached it. (R. 86) Apparently it is
appellant's contention that the sun may have been shining upon the signal in such a way as to prevent him
from detecting that it had turned red against him. That
being so, testimony as regards prior accidents occurring
at this intersection involving the affect of the sun upon
the semaphore would be admissible under the rules set
forth above. But appellant's approach is that of a scattergunner. In his proffer of proof he fails to show how
any of the prior accidents were related to the problem of
the sun shining into the signal. He urges that testimony
based on studies of all accidents over a protracted
period of time be admitted.

It is conceivable, but not probable, that all the prior
accidents involved this question of the effect of the rays
of the sun. Perhaps some of them did. But in absence of
a more definite showing to that effect in appellant's proffer of proof, the trial court was justified in assuming
that the testimony of Mr. Challis· would in the main be
irrelevant and it was therefore properly excluded.
"Where excluded evidence is not material unless
other proof is made, and no evidence is received
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or offered to establish that proof, such exclusion
will not justify a reversal.''
5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 1080.
The Court's ruling on the proffer of proof is not a
part of the record. However, the Judge's statement regarding the admissibility of the Challis testimony (R.
81-83) indicate that he was not satisfied that the prior
accidents met the test of substantial similarity. He was
also concerned about the inconvenience involved in analyzing many prior accidents to determine their relevancy.
This latter reason is in accord with the holding of at least
some courts, particularly as regards cases dealing with
dangerous condition as opposed to notice. These cases
are collected in annotation at 70 ALR 2d 170, 192.
That portion of the record dealing with the refusal
to admit the Challis testimony is printed below: (Italics
supplied)
''THE CouRT : I'm not sure I am going to let Mr.
Challis testify to that effect, Mr. McCullough, because I have ruled heretofore that that is immaterial. Whether a lot of other people have been
negligent or whether a lot of other people have
run stop signs is no concern of ours. Whether this
defendant was negligent is a concern of ours ; if
he is negligent, whether it is of such a grave nature as to constitute recklessness so as to bring him
within this charge; and I don't believe that this
jury or I would be interested in knowing that on
other occasions other people have done the same
thing. I think I would not take our time on that.

l\1R. McCuLLOUGH : Well, I think the testimony
that he can give with reference to this intersection
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and subsequent changes that have taken place are
rna terial and go to the very issue that we are trying to decide, this question of recklessness.
THE CouRT : Well, I'm not going to let him tell
about how many people have violated the law or
whether or not they have violated the law. I don't
think that helps us a bit. If there is anything peculiar about this intersection or its timing that
would help the jury in determining whether this
defendant violated the law, then, of course, it
would be material; but just for us to get out and
try to determine whether other people were violating the law· or not won't help us here. It seems
to me it is something like when a man is charged
with negligently shooting a deer hunter, and he
could show every year so many deer hunters get
shot every year. We are not interested in that
case. We are interested in what happened in this
case, and I will limit you to this case.
MR. McCULLOUGH : Of course, I don't want to dispute the rna tter with Your Honor since you have
the last word any way.
THE CouRT : Well, I do temporarily.
MR. McCuLLouGH: But if you are going to limit
it to that extent, the only issue is if the light was
red, the light was red when he ran it, then he is
guilty period.
"THE CouRT: No, that is not quite. My instructions will show that is not true. There has got to
be an element of recklessness in here before this
defendant is guilty.
MR. McCuLLOUGH: Well, we will proceed then,
Your Honor. If that is going to be Your Honor's
rulingTHE CouRT: Yes.
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MR. McCuLLOUGH : -of course, we would likeTHE CouRT: I am going to rule that this jury has
no interest in whether other people have run
lights because if we get that before us, we have
got to go into every case to find out whether somebody else was negligent, and that is not - well,
it seems to me we would be here a month, arnd I
had better stop it before we get started."
PoiNT II.
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUCH ERROR WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that the commission of error by the trial court will not be presumed
to have resulted in prejudice, and that a cause will not be
reversed for error unless that error affects the substantial rights of the party. See also State v. Neal (1953),
262 P. 2d 756, and State v. Justesen, 99 Pac. 456.
The evidence against appellant that was admitted
at trial was of such weight that the admission of the
testimony of Mr. Challis relating to prior accidents
would not have had any appreciable effect on the jury's
determination.

'' * * * the error is considered as harmless where
the evidence, if admitted, could not have affected
the result.''
5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 1069.
9
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Three persons who were eyewitnesses to the accident involving the appellant were called upon to testify
by the prosecution. Earl B. Taylor testified (R. 52-59)
that he was traveling south on 9th East. At the intersection of 9th East and 21st South he testified that he
stopped for a red light and that his auto was directly
behind that of the deceased, Mr. Weddington, who also
stopped for the light. He further testified that the light
turned green and the Weddington auto proceeded into
the intersection, and that it was struck broadside by a
pickup truck that was traveling west on 21st South by
the appellant. The appellant, according to Mr. Taylor,
did not stop before proceeding into the intersection.
Another eyewitness, Mrs. Joanne Monroe, testified
(R. 62-68) that she was traveling west on 21st South
in the right-hand lane of traffic. She was traveling behind another car. The car ahead of hers stopped at the
intersection, and she did likewise. She testified that the
light was red, and ''I didn't notice that I had any difficulty in seeing the light." She further testified: (R. 63)

''A. I had been stopped, oh, approximately three
or four seconds when I noticed - there was one
car in the lane next to me, and I noticed another
car approaching, but he did not seem to be slowing down to stop for the red light.
Q. Okeh. Now, you say he was in the lane to your
left?
A. Yes.

Q. All right, and what happened?
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A. Well, my first idea was that he was going to
run the red light, and as he continued on into the
intersection, I noticed another car approaching
from the north, and then I thought there was
going to be an accident.

Q. And what - will you tell me, did you see the
accident happen f

A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what happened f
A. The car that had passed me on the left hit the
car that was going south through the intersection.''
The third eyewitness, Douglas Hubbard (R. 68-78),
testified that he was traveling north on 9th East and that
he stopped for a red light at the intersection of 21st
South. The light turned green in his favor and he proceeded into the intersection but stopped when he saw the
approaching truck driven by appellant. (R. 69)
Mr. Hubbard further testified: (R. 61)
''A. After the light turned green - I am in the
habit of looking at traffic. I don't trust the light,
and as I looked to my right, I saw this truck,
pick-up truck, and he seemed to be coming along
at a fairly good speed, and I didn't think he was
going to stop, and I had crossed the lane about
three feet approximately, so I stopped, and the
truck went in front of me.

Q. And did you see what happened to the truck f
"A. Yes. The truck hit I believe it was a gray
Plymouth. It hit it approximately in the center.
It took just about the front door and back of the
front door, approximately the center of the car.''

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'' Q. All right. Can you tell me what, if anything,
you noticed about the speed of this truck from that
point on~

A. I would say he was traveling close to twentyfive miles an hour, and as he approached the cross
lane, he stepped on it, and I would say at the point
of impact he was traveling about thirty. He had
increased his speed I would say about five miles an
hour.
Q. Will you tell me what makes you think that he
increased his speed~

A. Well, just normal observation, and I could
hear the sound. It wasn't too new a truck, and
you could hear the roar of it as he stepped on it,
and you could see the actual movement that it was
moving faster.''
In synthesis, the testimony of these witnesses was
that there were, in addition to the Weddington car and
the truck of appellant, four other automobiles at or near
the scene of the accident. Two of these, the Monroe car
and another, were traveling west on 21st South, the same
as the appellant. The appellant was traveling in the inside lane, the Monroe car and another in the right-hand
lane. Both the Monroe car and the one directly in front
of it stopped for the red light. Apparently the drivers of
both cars were able to see the red light, and indeed, Mrs.
Monroe testified she had no difficulty in seeing it. Yet,
even though these cars were stopped in the lane next to
the appellant and presumably could be seen by him, he
did not stop. The two witnesses who were traveling on
9th East, one going south, the other north, testified that
the light was green for traffic proceeding on 9th East
12
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at the time Mr. Weddington proceeded into the intersection. This, together with the testimony of Mrs. Monroe, strongly establishes that the light was red when the
appellant proceeded through it. Sufficient evidence was
presented that the light was against the appellant, and
that others traveling in the same direction saw the red
light and were stopped at the intersection at the time
appellant proceeded through. Appellant was also observed to have increased his speed as he neared the
intersection.
The jury weighed the evidence and determined that
appellant "did unlawfully and negligently drive said vehicle with reckless disregard for the safety of others.''
(R. 8) Had this evidence relative to prior accidents been
admitted it would not, in light of the weight of other evidence admitted, operated to have changed the verdict returned by the jury. It is therefore urged that the exclusion of the prior accident evidence, even if error, was
uot prejudicial.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF
SUCH ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
POINT

Appellant's Point II(A) (B. 34) deals with admission
of testimony by Officer Johnson wherein the officer states
that appellant made certain statements to him at the
scene of the accident. (R. 39) It is not clear whether
appellant contends that this testimony was inadmis~ible,
or that the error, if any, consisted in the court's refusal
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to allow cross-examination by appellant. In either case,
the testimony involves whether appellant did or did not
run the red light, and whether he did or did not admit
same. As there is sufficient testimony of other parties,
which is uncontroverted, that appellant did run the red
light, there seems little reason to pursue this issue. If
error was in fact committed in this regard, it could not
have been prejudicial.
As to appellant's Point II (B) (B. 35), respondent's
position in regard to the testimony of Officer Johnson
concerning the danger of the intersection is substantially
the same as that set forth in Point I of respondent's brief.
The fact that this intersection may have been dangerous
is not relevant, absent some showing of substantial re-lationship between the case at bar and the dangers connected with the intersection.
Appellant's Point II(C) (B. 35) also deals with testimony concerning prior accidents. The same reasoning
applies here as in the other situations involving testimony of prior accidents.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the lower
court should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
ROLAND G. ROBISON, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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